Kautilya and Asymmetric Warfare
In search of ways to combat asymmetric warfare
Asymmetric warfare has been a topical and an important subject since the attacks on 9/11. However, the concept of asymmetric warfare is not as new as it is sometimes made out to be. Perhaps it is the first time that asymmetric warfare has captured the attention of the American public, the media, and the administration. It is now understood that security sector reforms are needed to tackle asymmetric warfare. This paper claims that it is extremely important for big powers to not only understand asymmetric warfare, but to master the art and science of it. In discussing this hypothesis, the paper will try to answer the question; why have states failed to adapt to asymmetric warfare in the modern age and?
This paper will consider the issue of asymmetric warfare and try to understand the problems states face in dealing with it. The paper will also suggest some viable options that the states could consider to effectively fight asymmetric wars. In doing so, the paper will consider the U.S. war in Afghanistan and the Punjab insurgency movement in India during the 1980s and 1990s as illustrations. The objective of using illustrations will be to understand as to why it is extremely important for big powers to devote more resources towards understanding and to master the art of asymmetric warfare. The paper will look at the seminal text, the Arthashastra, by Kautilya which was written in the third century BCE to understand the importance of understanding non – traditional methods of warfare like asymmetric warfare and why he considers tools of guerrilla warfare and other methods of sabotage and subversion to be a quintessential tool of statecraft.
The paper comes to the conclusion that states could learn some valuable lessons from the strategists of the past regarding the underlying principle behind asymmetric warfare. This paper claims that while there has been an evolution in guerrilla warfare over time, the basic philosophy that drives a weaker actor to fight asymmetric or guerrilla warfare is still the same as it was twenty three hundred years ago, hence making the philosophy and ideas of Kautilya valuable and perennial. The paper also outlines the importance of formulating a holistic strategy to combat asymmetric warfare which includes cultural, political, social and military aspects. Finally the paper concludes that the biggest challenge for the U.S. and other big powers is to change its mind set if it wants to tackle asymmetric warfare effectively.
Philosophy of ‘Asymmetric’/Guerrilla warfare: Past and Present
Dr. Rod Thornton, a lecturer at King’s College’s War Studies departments states that “asymmetric warfare is violent action undertaken by the ‘have – nots’ against the ‘haves’ whereby the have – nots, be it state or sub – state actors, seek to generate profound effects – at all levels of warfare (however defined), from the tactical to the strategic – by employing their own specific relative advantages against the vulnerabilities of a much stronger opponents.” Thus asymmetric warfare is defined rather broadly that can include different methods as long as the principle of asymmetry and lop – sidedness in resources between two actors holds true.
Kautilya in his work, the Arthashastra states that “a single assassin can achieve, with weapons, fire or poison, more than a fully mobilized army.” While Kautilya’s tactics of subversion is certainly different from modern day asymmetric warfare, the idea and philosophy of asymmetry behind the use of assassins and guerrillas in past and the present is the same. In both cases the ‘have – nots’, be it states or non state actors can have profound effects by employing asymmetric tactics irrespective of their strengths and weaknesses. Conversely, through asymmetric tactics, even strong states can achieve their goals by spending an insignificant amount of resources. In the words of Colonel Clinton J. Ancker, “asymmetric warfare deals with unknowns, with surprise in terms of ends, ways and means.” This shows that the ways adopted by Kautilya can give us insights into an earlier form of asymmetric warfare.
In his philosophy of ‘concealed war’ and ‘silent war’ he discusses the use of guerrilla warfare, assassination, use of prostitutes as assassins and informers, and contrived conflicts to win battles against an adversary king. However, the interesting aspect of ‘concealed war’ and ‘silent war’ is that he advises both the powerful kings and the weak kings to use ‘concealed war’ and ‘silent war’ as a way to keep the enemy kings in check. He also states that weaker states will always resort to the use of silent war as defeating a bigger and stronger state in the battlefield is impossible for them. Thus he believes that the biggest threat that a ‘super power’ state (in his time, the Mauryan Empire) is not on the battlefield, but is from silent and proxy war that invariably involve asymmetric warfare tactics. Similarly the Chinese strategist Sun Tzu stated that an army should avoid strength [of the enemy] and strike at weakness. The reason why Kautilya is being cited as an example here is because he, being the Prime Minister of the strongest empire in South Asia, and perhaps in Asia at that time, understood the relative importance of and the threat from non – traditional methods of warfare to his empire, which included the use of assassins and guerrilla warfare, which could not be tackled just by the traditional army, irrespective of its size and power. Non – traditional methods were used to spread a sense of chaos to unnerve the big power and drive it towards making unwise decisions which in turn would eventually lead to its downfall.
It sounds logical to think that a weaker power or entity would never challenge a powerful country through traditional means. Therefore, it leads us to ask another, perhaps a rhetorical question, as to why big states, like the U.S. have failed to understand the incapability and irrelevance of traditional military tactics to tackle asymmetric warfare? Interestingly, many of the tactics that are used by militant/terrorist organizations to recruit people into their outfits are similar, if not identical to the tactics that Kautilya used to sow the seeds of discord in the kingdom of the adversary king. Many of the extremist outfits tend to recruit people who are alienated or feel a sense of alienation and dissatisfaction. Kautilya in the Arthashastra states that “miraculous results can be achieved by practicing the methods of subversion.” Kautilya was aware of the deadly effect that non – traditional methods of warfare.
Kautilya uses methods of ‘silent warfare’ to establish contacts with people who are willing to work against the enemy king. Kautilya approaches those individuals who are dissatisfied with the enemy. He approaches those who are “angry at the enemy and want to see him out of power; those who are frightened by the enemy; those who are insulted by the enemy, those disappointed in their expectation from the enemy, those who are impoverished or suffering from adversity, those denied their rewards for meritorious service and those whose loyalties had been secretly tested.”In other words, Kautilya systematically tries to gathers people who are dissatisfied and frustrated with the enemy or have grievances (legitimate or illegitimate) that have not been addressed by the enemy king. Similar tactics are used my terrorist organizations like al – Qaeda.
Recruiting the Dissatisfied:
While the process of recruitment for terrorist organizations like al – Qaeda has evolved over time, the basic principle even today is to attract those who may be alienated or dissatisfied in their societies for various reasons. The process of recruitment of terrorists is rather systematic and a certain section of the population that may be socially or economically vulnerable is targeted. Many of the recruits seem to have come from the lower strata of the economic ladder. Various terrorist organizations tend to guarantee a compensation for the family of the militants. However, in addition to this, terrorist organizations like al – Qaeda have also started the use of technological tools like the internet to attract the youth from the middle class and upper classes in the Muslim world.
Other systems of recruitment like ‘the funnel’ are also used whereby a potential member is transformed over the training period and those who do not go through the transformation exit the recruitment process. Both these methods are geared towards recruiting people outside the circle of people and communities that have traditionally supported al – Qaeda. 
It has been said that poverty alone does not explain the existence of terrorism and the link if any is indirect and weak. It has therefore been argued that ‘terrorism is a result of political frustrations and indignation (imagined or real) and not poverty. Martha Crenshaw, a political scientist at Stanford University, states that “It is a strategy rooted in political discontent, used in the service of many different beliefs and doctrines that help legitimize and sustain violence. Ideologies associated with nationalism, revolution, religion, and defense of the status quo have all inspired terrorism.” Her views also resonate with those of kautilya who exploits the discontent and dissatisfaction in the people and uses it to his own advantage.
One of the main events that Crenshaw believes has shaped modern day ‘terrorism’ is globalization. While globalization is not considered as a direct cause of terrorism, it is considered as a facilitator. In other words, globalization is the catalyst that gives stimulus to social, economic, nationalist, religious or cultural variables which in turn affect the way terrorism evolves under certain circumstance. This means that the causes for terrorism in different areas of the world are exclusive to that area as different sets of variables may be predominant in different areas and in different times.Therefore, terrorism is the response of a section of the population which feels vulnerable, alienated and threatened because of globalization. In other words, terrorism in modern times is predominantly the response of the weak (with the exception of state – sponsored terrorism).
How states respond: Exploring alternative responses
Unfortunately, states in most cases have failed to understand the importance of understanding and preparing for counter – terrorism or asymmetric warfare. States continue to use outdated techniques that were never meant to be used to combat asymmetric warfare. This also includes the way a state negotiates. For instance, during the Punjab insurgency, the Indian government strictly followed the model of “tactical concession of political power at the state level as quid pro quo for deflection, diffusion and de – emphasis on ethnic demands.”
The negotiation process led to the Rajiv – Longowal Accord in 1985 that guaranteed compensation for the innocent victims of the insurgency and guaranteed justice for them. However, this turned out to be a symbolic agreement and was never really implemented. The inability to implement the Rajiv – Longowal Accords coupled with the hawkish negotiation tactics of the Indian government gave a picture of an uncaring and arrogant regime, further justifying the cause of Khalistan for many Punjabis. Furthermore, Punjab under President’s rule from 1987 to 1993 was under a virtual ‘police raj’ which led to some of the worst human rights violations. However, the police officials have time and again stated that while the police may be partially guilty, a certain degree of human rights violations are inevitable while fighting insurgency. The fact that the situation in Punjab has returned to normalcy has led many to believe that the government’s strategy of “bullet for a bullet” has worked. K.P.S. Gill, the former chief of police ruthlessly prosecuted the anti – insurgency campaign. During his time as the chief of police, while many insurgents were caught or killed, a number of innocents were also killed. Till today there are pending cases of human rights violation against police officers who were in charge of the anti – insurgency campaign.
However, some have given an alternative explanation for why terrorism ended in Punjab. Many believe that the militants were defeated not just because of the anti – terrorist policies of the government, but more so because of the rural society, where the militants were primarily located. “Militants in their daily operations became ensnared in existing social networks, including local feuds and factional enmities, kinship retribution, and the social underworld of criminality as well as in the private accumulation of wealth and personal aggrandizement.” Therefore, the movement died because of factors endogenous to it rather than external forces, like the police or the army. Furthemore, because of the criminalization of the movement, it lost a significant amount of support from the Punjabi population. This some believe was the final blow to the Khalistan movement. Thus, it is said that K.P.S. Gill and his police department killed a ‘dead tiger.’
The point being made here is that the lack of societal support led to the end of the insurgency and militancy in Punjab. States need to break out of their traditional methods of dealing with insurgency. States must stop dealing with insurgency like a war and consider other methods. If the Indian government had spent a little more time and attention on understanding the significance and the relevance of Punjab rural society it could have crafted a much more effective anti – terrorist policy which would not have led to so much blood shed, violence and human rights violations. Antulio Echevarria, who is the director of research at Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, states that one of the ways to tackle asymmetric adversaries, or any adversary for that matter, is by “looking for connections among the various parts of an adversary, or adversaries, in order to determine what holds them together.” By identifying the fault lines in the enemy camp one can defeat the enemy or enemies even without engaging them on the battlefield.
The idea is primarily to separate out the radicals from the moderate which would give a more lucid picture of the situation. John Jandora, an analyst at the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, states that while the tendency is generally to club all the “Jihadists” into one group. However, “one finds evidence of doctrinal discord” between different Jihadi groups like the Mujahedeen and al Qaeda. Unfortunately, we see that states tend to rely solely on force which tends to backfire because, if a state itself legitimizes the use of force, how can it expect other militants to give up arms? Thus, the state must not resort to the use of force every time there is an emerging crisis and must give dialogue and diplomacy a chance.
However, the modern face of terrorism does differ from the kinds of terrorist and militant activities witnessed in the past. Rod Thornton states that terrorist organizations in the past like the ETA, IRA and the Red Army Faction conducted “small – scale propagandistic attacks against symbols of state – such as its security forces. If innocent bystanders were killed, it was usually unintentional.” He goes on to say that the “Islamist terrorists have modified Sun Tzu’s edict from “kill one person, frighten a thousand” to “kill a thousand, frighten a million.”” Thornton believes that the modern terrorists have given up making the distinction between state and its citizenry thereby including the ‘whole enemy society’. This has certainly contributed to an increased awareness about terrorism among the public. Furthermore, Thornton states that the characteristics that define the new breed of ‘terrorists’ are “1) increased degree of fervor. 2) their increased ability to implement attacks and 3) their increased ability to cause mass destruction.”
While Islam does not support or advocate terrorism, there are a few misguided Muslims who misquote the Quran and misrepresent Islam for their own vested interests, or sometimes out of sheer ignorance. The idea behind the use of religion in recruiting militants is convoluted and unfortunate. It can be argued that the twisted use of religion tends to justify the killing of innocent people for the militant. Furthermore, the promise of going to paradise upon death tends to make the prospect of death less scary and depressing, if not desirable, given the poor living conditions many of the militants come from. Simply put, while religion does not support terrorism and may not be the driving force behind it, it is the ‘opium of the masses’ that mobilizes people.
Other factors that lead to an increase in extremism and fervor in ‘terrorists’ are occupation of the holy land by American troops, a sense of disrespect of Islam (imagined and real) by the West and intractable issues like the Israeli – Palestinian conflict where the U.S. has consistently shown partiality towards Israel. The lack of even handedness in the U.S. in dealing with the Israeli – Palestinian conflict has enraged many Muslims around the world, enabling some leaders to use this rage to incite hatred and recruit militants.
For various reasons, many of these ‘terrorist’ organizations that engage in asymmetric warfare have also attracted many educated people who come from middle class backgrounds. This has among other things made technology more accessible to ‘terrorist’ organizations. For instance, one of the prime accused in the recent Ahmedabad bomb blasts was a software engineer who worked for one of the leading software companies in India. Even Mohamed Atta who was one of the hijackers on 9/11 was a student at the Technical University of Hamburg. Therefore, with the increase in fervor, recruitment of technically educated militants and the availability of information on building explosives on the internet and books, ‘terrorist’ organizations have increased their ability to cause mass destruction.
Recent reports have been suggesting that the U.S. forces have been finding it difficult to tackle asymmetric warfare in Afghanistan. After fighting a technology driven war in Afghanistan where air strikes were extensively used to defeat the Taliban and al Qaeda, people in the U.S. defense establishment have started understanding the futility of the use of air power and excessive reliance on technology. It is now thought that conventional military force does not prove to be effective against irregular/asymmetric warfare. This is because asymmetric warfare not only defies the traditional rules of engagement and “calls for cultural, political and military qualities that are not the traditional strengths of Americans.” Standard tools of warfare do not prove to be adequate in meeting the new challenges that have been posed by asymmetric or irregular warfare. While the use of air power, which is very important for the U.S. may have been successful in killing a few militants in Afghanistan, the majority of the victims of air raids have been civilians. At the same time militants have tended to take shelter in heavily populated areas which cause more civilian causalities. Such events have led to a backlash against the Afghan government and the international forces.
In the case of the U.S. the biggest hurdle in adapting to asymmetric warfare seems to be changing the existing mind set. America’s excessive reliance on technology while may be a great advantage when fighting a state, it does not prove to be helpful in fighting an asymmetric war like the one in Afghanistan. Thornton states that “in the American case there has always a great deal of technological help available, and the temptation is to let that deal with the problem. This thinking is flawed in that it can lead to the exclusion of better alternatives.” In cases of asymmetric warfare, nothing can ever replace human intelligence. However, the use of human intelligence can prove to be tricky because it can potentially lead to an increase in the risk to the lives of agents and the troops. Technology and air power tend to be destructive and reduce the risk to the lives of the troops on the ground.
However, given the technological disparity between the Taliban and the U.S. troops, and the landscape of Afghanistan, technology may not prove to be as effective. It will be important for the U.S. to switch to using human intelligence and rely more on people who know the terrain of Afghanistan and Northwest Pakistan very well. That having been said, the involvement of technology in the fighting ‘terrorism’ is necessary to a certain extent. Many militants have started using cell phones as a way of communication. The availability of such technology at a low cost has certainly given a boost to the ‘terrorist’ networks.
Understanding culture and social structure of the opponent also provides valuable information on how these militants think, behave and what their worldview is. As seen in the Punjab case, the government of India underestimated the influence that the rural social structure had on the militants. In the case of Afghanistan, understanding the tribal culture and code can help the U.S. troops a lot to not only understand the opponent, but respecting the tribal culture will also earn them a lot of goodwill.
Another very important aspect that needs to be understood by the U.S. is the importance of using the appropriate amount of force. During the Grenada war a Cuban officer in Grenada stated that the American “reaction was to destroy everything with their planes and artillery fire and see what’s left.” Similarly the UN official, Carl Bildt stated that there was “little between doing nothing and a massive use of military force” for the American troops. Therefore, finding the middle ground with respect to the use of force is very important for the Americans, if they want to have a successful strategy against ‘terrorism’ and insurgency. This is because; finding militants in a region is equivalent to trying to find a needle in a haystack. The militants tend to blend themselves into the local population which makes it difficult to distinguish them from the civilian population. The use of planes and artillery make it very difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between the militants and the civilian population. At the same time, one must understand the fact that given the terrain of the region in Afghanistan and Northwest Pakistan, it is very difficult to mobilize tanks and artillery in such mountainous regions.
Discretion shown in the use of military force will be a lot more helpful in winning the ‘hearts and minds of the people’ as it is the civilian population that suffers the most because of military force. Even if we look back in time, the British government in its campaign against the Communist ‘terrorists’ undertook a “campaign of public information, civic action, and other persuasive measures by which the government won the crucially important support of the populace.” Even Kautilya states that the biggest power of a king is the goodwill of the populace inside and even outside his kingdom. This shows that it is just not enough if there is a moderation in the use of military force. It is also important for the U.S. government to involve the local populace in defeating extremism and ‘terrorism’ in Afghanistan or in Iraq. Involving the populace in the ‘war on terrorism’ will automatically alienate the militants who tend to rely on public support. In fact the Taliban has been losing members because members have been returning to their tribal obligations and primal allegiance. A Similar pattern was seen during the Punjab insurgency in the late 1980s when many militants were not able to completely isolate themselves from their society which led to the extinction of the insurgency movement. This further proves the influence and strength that social rules and obligations tend to have on even rebellious militants and insurgency movements.
In sum, the basic point this paper makes is that the basic philosophy that drives asymmetric warfare is not necessarily a new phenomenon as history does have some valuable lessons that modern strategists could learn. Furthermore, this paper tries to make the point that it is important for big powers to understand and master the art and science of asymmetric warfare. Kautilya in the third century BCE stated that “a single assassin can achieve, with weapons, fire or poison, more than a fully mobilized army.” Thus Kautilya understood the effectiveness and the importance of non – traditional methods of warfare and expected the strong king to understand and master the art of such non – traditional methods of warfare.
He advised the strong kings not only to keep a close eye on his associates and allies, but to surround the enemy kings and the weak kings with his agents so that no one could use subversive and guerrilla tactics to either assassinate the strong king or create disruptions within his empire. Similarly the Chinese strategist Sun Tzu stated that an army should avoid strength [of the enemy] and strike at weakness. That said, the modern concept of asymmetric warfare and ‘terrorism’ has evolved over time and have characteristics of their own given the circumstances. However, they are similar to ‘silent war’ because both fall under the category of non – traditional warfare, for their time periods.
Furthermore, the problem seems to be that governments tend to have a set model on how to deal with insurgencies. We have seen how both the Indian government and the U.S. government have used standard methods, like the use of military force to try and resolve issues of insurgencies. It is now believed that asymmetric warfare and counter – terrorism is so complex that standard responses are not only ineffective, but tend to be counterproductive. Tactics employed against asymmetric warfare must be flexible and there cannot be a checklist for a set of tactics that ensure success. This is because each case of counter – insurgency and asymmetric warfare is different and thus tactics and strategies need to be flexible and adjustable.
In the case of the U.S. Dr. Rod Thornton states that it is the “U.S. armed forces, more than all others, that need to think most about how to counter asymmetric adversaries,” His views seem to be in agreement with even ancient strategists like Kautilya who states that big states need to be prepared to fight ‘silent wars’ and not just conventional wars, as other states would tend to choose subversive ways to attack and defeat the major power than choose to challenge it on the battlefield. Given the threats faced by the U.S, it must not rely heavily on technology and must understand the importance and value of human intelligence. Human intelligence will prove to be more effective because unlike technological intelligence, human intelligence can predict the motives, present and future intentions and the state of mind of the enemy.
The U.S. will now have to get used to a new kind of warfare that will tend to prolonged, highly variable in form and complex. The U.S. army cannot have the luxury of planning every move out and expect the plans to materialize. Given the amorphous form of asymmetric warfare, there will be a greater need to adopt a more flexible doctrine to combat asymmetric warfare. This also means that there has to be a greater degree of moderation shown in the use of military force. The culture of a Manichean or dualistic strategy of either using no force or excessive military force has to give way to a more multi layered approach with each layer representing a gradual increase in the use of military force.
Another aspect that needs to be addressed by the U.S. military establishment is the need to factor in culture in fighting asymmetric warfare. For instance, in Afghanistan, it would be very beneficial to the U.S. army if it spent some time and effort understanding the tribal culture and codes of conduct. This will certainly give a context to the fight against ‘terrorism’ in Afghanistan and will also help differentiate between the extremists and the moderates in the society. It has been illustrated earlier that even though insurgents tend to operate outside the societal norms, these insurgents have tended to get involved in their society. This has been true in Punjab during the 1980s and in Afghanistan today. Thus cultural and social norms could be used to reintegrate many of the insurgents into their tribe or society which would weaken terrorist organizations like al – Qaeda and the Taliban. However, to do so, the U.S. military must earn the goodwill of the people of Afghanistan and Iraq. By understanding and respecting the cultures and practices of the Afghan and Iraqi societies, the U.S. would not only be able to earn the goodwill of the general populace, but will show the world that the U.S. does respect Islam, thus giving one less tool to the extremists to indoctrinate the youth against the West.
Most importantly, the U.S. government must reform its mind set if it has to be able to fight asymmetric warfare. At present the problem seems to be that the U.S. prefers traditional wars because it is the best at it. Furthermore, as Dr. Thornton puts it, fighting traditional wars gives the U.S. a chance to display its technological prowess. Asymmetric warfare tends to neither give the U.S. the opportunity to display its technological prowess nor the opportunity to end the war quickly and secure a decisive victory. Thus the need of the hour is to rethink American military strategy with respect to asymmetric warfare and nurture a military culture that is not only discreet in its use of military force, but also uses military force smartly.
 Thornton, Rod. “Asymmetric Warfare” Polity Press, 2007. pg. 1.
 Kautilya. “Kautilya: The Arthashastra.” Ed. Rangarajan, L.N Penguine Books, 1992. pg. 498.
 Ancker, Col. Clinton J. “Doctrine for Asymmetric Warfare.” Military Review. July – August 2003.http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/ancker.pdf. pg.18.
 Boesche, Robert. “Kautilya’s Arthashastra on War and Diplomacy in Ancient India.” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 67, No.1. January 2003.http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_military_history/v067/67.1boesche.html. pg. 10.
 Ibid. pg. 28
 Thornton, Rod. “Asymmetric Warfare” Polity Press, 2007. pg. 2
 Boesche, Robert. “Kautilya’s Arthashastra on War and Diplomacy in Ancient India.” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 67, No.1. January 2003. http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_military_history/v067/67.1boesche.pdf. pg.22
 Kautilya. “Kautilya: The Arthashastra.” Ed. Rangarajan, L.N Penguin Books, 1992. pg. 498
 Ibid. pg. 520, 521, 522.
 Gerwehr, Scott. Daly, Sara. “al – Qaeda: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment.” McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook, 2006, Chapter 5. http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/2006/RAND_RP1214.pdf. pg.76 , 77.
 Krueger, Allan B. Maleckova, Jitka. “The Economics and the Education of Suicide Bombers: Does Poverty Cause Terrorism.” The New Republic Online. July 20, 2002. http://www.alanalexandroff.com/nr-krueger.pdf
 Crenshaw, Martha. “Political Explanations.” “Addressing the Causes of Terrorism.” Ed. Neumann, Peter R. Club de Madrid. 2005. http://media.clubmadrid.org/docs/CdM-Series-on-Terrorism-Vol-1.pdf. pg. 13.
 Ibid. pg. 13
 Singh, Gurharpal. “Punjab since 1984, Disorder, Order and Legitimacy.” Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 4. April 1996. pg. 412
 Ibid. pg. 416.
 Jandora, John W. “Center of Gravity and Asymmetric Conflict: Factoring in Culture.” JFQ, Issue thirty – nine. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1439.pdf . pg. 78.
 Ibid. pg. 81
 Thornton, Rod. “Asymmetric Warfare” Polity Press, 2007. pg. 26
 Ibid. pg. 26
 Ibid. pg. 27
 “Ex – Wipro engineer’s role in Ahmedabad blasts under scanner.” The Indian News. August 16, 2008.http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/world-news/ex-wipro-engineers-role-in-ahmedabad-blasts-under-scanner_10084982.html
 Gray, Colin S. “Irregular Warfare: One Nature, Many Characters.” Strategic Studies Quarterly. Winter 2007.http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/ssq/2007/Winter/gray.pdf. pg. 54.
 “Afghanistan: Civilian Deaths from Airstrikes.” The Human Rights Watch. September 2008. http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2008/09/08/afghan19766.htm
 Thornton, Rod. “Asymmetric Warfare” Polity Press, 2007. pg. 157
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 Thornton, Rod. “Asymmetric Warfare” Polity Press, 2007. pg. 151
 Ibid. pg. 151
 Sunderland, Riley. “Winning the Hearts and Minds of the People: Malaya, 1948-1960.” RAND Corporation, Memorandum RM – 4174 – ISA. September 1964.http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/2005/RM4174.pdf
 Boesche, Robert. “Kautilya’s Arthashastra on War and Diplomacy in Ancient India.” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 67, No.1. January 2003. http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_military_history/v067/67.1boesche.pdf. pg. 28.
 Jandora, John W. “Center of Gravity and Asymmetric Conflict: Factoring in Culture.” JFQ, Issue thirty – nine. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1439.pdf . pg. 82
 Kautilya. “Kautilya: The Arthashastra.” Ed. Rangarajan, L.N Penguine Books, 1992. pg. 498.
 Thornton, Rod. “Asymmetric Warfare” Polity Press, 2007. pg. 2
 Ancker, Col. Clinton J. “Doctrine for Asymmetric Warfare.” Military Review. July – August 2003.http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/ancker.pdf. pg. 18, 25.
 Thornton, Rod. “Asymmetric Warfare” Polity Press, 2007. pg. 150.